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Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law
Barbara Johnson*
Anthropomorphism. n. The attribution of human motivation,
characteristics, or behavior to inanimate objects, animals, or natural
phenomena.
-American Heritage Dictionary1
Through a singular ambiguity, through a kind of transposition or
intellectual quid pro quo, you will feel yourself evaporating, and
you will attribute to your ... tobacco, the strange ability to smoke
you.
-Baudelaire, Artificial Paradises2
Recent discussions of the relations between law and literature have
tended to focus on prose-novels, short stories, autobiographies, even
plays-rather than on lyric poetry.3 Literature has been seen as a
locus of plots and situations that parallel legal cases or problems,
either to shed light on complexities not always acknowledged by the
ordinary practice of legal discourse or to shed light on cultural crises
and debates that historically underlie and inform literary texts. But,
* Fredric Wertham Professor of Law and Psychiatry in Society, Harvard University. The
author would like to thank Shoshana Felman for her stimulating response to an earlier version
of this paper.
1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 78 (William Morris
ed., 3d ed. 1992).
2. CHARLES BAUDELAIRE, Les Paradis Artificiels, in 1 OEUVRES COMPLtTEs 375, 420
(Claude Pichois ed., 1975).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
(1988); RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER
IN MODERN FICTION (1984); Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law &
Literature, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1996); Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise,
1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of
Consent in the Moral and Political Vision of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV.
384 (1985). But see Thomas Grey, Steel Against Intimation: The Motive for Metaphor of Wallace
Stevens, Esq., 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 231 (1990), and Margaret Jane Radin, After the Final No
There Comes a Yes: A Law Teacher's Report, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 253 (1990), for an
interesting discussion of Wallace Stevens, as well as the more extended treatment of Wallace
Stevens in THOMAS GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF
POETRY (1991).
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in a sense, this focus on prose is surprising, since lyric poetry has, at
least historically, been the more law-abiding or rule-bound of the
genres. Indeed, the sonnet form has been compared to a prison
(Wordsworth4) or at least to a bound woman (Keats'), and
Baudelaire's portraits of lyric depression (Spleen6) are often written
as if from behind bars. What are the relations between the laws of
genre7 and the laws of the state? The present paper might be seen as
asking this question through the juxtaposition, as it happens, of two
sonnets and a prisoners' association.
More profoundly, though, lyric and law might be seen as two very
different ways of instating what a "person" is. There appears to be the
greatest possible discrepancy between a lyric "person"--emotive,
subjective, individual-and a legal "person"-rational, rights-bearing,
institutional. In this paper I will try to show, through the question of
anthropomorphism, how these two "persons" can illuminate each
other.
My argument develops out of the juxtaposition of two texts: Paul
de Man's essay, Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric,' in which
I try to understand why for de Man the question of anthropo-
morphism is at the heart of the lyric, and the text of a Supreme Court
opinion from 1993, Rowland v. California Men's Colony.9 This case
has not become a household name like Roe v. Wade1" or Brown v.
Board of Education,"l and probably with good reason. What is at
stake in it appears trivial-at bottom, it is about an association of
prisoners suing for the right to have "free cigarette" privileges
restored. But the Supreme Court's task is not to decide whether the
prisoners have the right to smoke (an increasingly contested right, as
it happens, in the United States today). The case has come before the
Court to resolve the question of whether their council can be counted
4. William Wordsworth's sonnet, Nuns Fret Not at Their Convent's Narrow Room, contains
the lines, "In truth the prison, unto which we doom/ Ourselves, no prison is: and hence to me.)
In sundry moods, 'twas pastime to be bound/ Within the Sonnet's scanty plot of ground."
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Nuns Fret Not at Their Convent's Narrow Room, in SELECTED
POETRY AND PROSE OF WORDSWORTH 169, 169 (Geoffrey H. Hartman ed., 1970).
5. John Keats's sonnet on the sonnet begins, "If by dull rhymes our English must be
chained,/ And, like Andromeda, the sonnet sweet/ Fettered .... JOHN KEATS, On the Sonnet,
in SELECTED POETRY 264, 264 (Paul de Man ed., 1966).
6. One of several poems by Baudelaire entitled Spleen describes a mood produced by or
analogized to a rainy day: "Quand la pluie dtalant ses immenses traindes/ D'une vaste prison
imite les barreaux .... " CHARLES BAUDELAIRE, Spleen, in 1 OEUVRES COMPLt-TES, supra note
2, at 75.
7. For a suggestive discussion of what it means for a text to obey the law of genre, see
JACQUES DERRIDA, The Law of Genre, in ACTS OF LITERATURE 22 (Derek Attridge ed., 1992).
8. PAUL DE MAN, Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric, in THE RHETORIC OF
ROMANTICISM 239 (1984).
9. Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993).
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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as a juridical "person" under the law. What is at stake, then, in both
the legal and the lyric texts is the question: What is a person?
I
I will begin by discussing the article by Paul de Man, which is one
of the most difficult, even outrageous, of his essays. Both hyperbolic
and elliptical, it makes a number of very strong claims about literary
history, lyric pedagogy, and the materiality of "historical modes of
language power."12 Toward the end of his text, de Man somewhat
unexpectedly reveals that the essay originated in an invitation to
speak on the nature of lyric. But it begins with some general remarks
about the relation between epistemology and rhetoric (which can
stand as a common contemporary way of framing the relations
between law and literature). The transition between the question of
the lyric and the question of epistemology and rhetoric is made
through the Keatsian chiasmus, "Beauty is truth, truth beauty,"13
which de Man quotes on his way to Nietzsche's short and "better
known than understood" 4 essay, Truth and Falsity in an Ultramoral
Sense.15 "What is truth?" Nietzsche asks in that essay's most oft-
quoted moment: "a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and
anthropomorphisms."16 Thus it would seem that Nietzsche has
answered, "Truth is trope, trope truth" or "epistemology is rhetoric,
rhetoric epistemology." But de Man wants to show in what ways
Nietzsche is not saying simply this. First, the list of tropes is, he says,
"odd."17 While metaphor and metonymy are the names of tropes
that designate a pure structure of relation (metaphor is a relation of
similarity between two entities, while metonymy is a relation of
contiguity), de Man claims that anthropomorphism, while structured
similarly, is not a trope. It is not the name of a pure rhetorical
structure, but the name of a comparison, one of whose terms is
treated as a given (as epistemologically resolved). To use an anthro-
pomorphism is to treat as known what the properties of the human
are.
12. DE MAN, supra note 8, at 262.
13. JOHN KEATS, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in SELECTED POETRY, supra note 5, at 252, 253.
This allusion to Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn stands in for the premise of the compatibility of
literary aesthetics with linguistic structures, and of linguistic structures with perceptual or
intuitive knowledge, that de Man is often at pains to contest. See his remarks on the pedagogical
model of the trivium in PAUL DE MAN, The Resistance to Theory, in THE RESISTANCE TO
THEORY 3, 13-20 (1986).
14. DE MAN, supra note 8, at 239.
15. Friedrich Nietzsche, Truth and Falsity in an Ultranoral Sense, in CRITICAL THEORY
SINCE PLATO 634 (Hazard Adams ed., 1992). If the Keats poem asserts that aesthetic and
epistemological structures are compatible, Nietzche's text, for de Man, is a parody of that claim.
16. Id. at 636.
17. DE MAN, supra note 8, at 240.
1998]
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"Anthropomorphism" is not just a trope but an identification on
the level of substance. It takes one entity for another and thus
implies the constitution of specific entities prior to their con-
fusion, the taking of something for something else that can then
be assumed to be given. Anthropomorphism freezes the infinite
chain of tropological transformations and propositions into one
single assertion or essence which, as such, excludes all others. It
is no longer a proposition but a proper name."
Why does he call this a proper name? Shouldn't the essence that is
taken as given be a concept? If "man" is what is assumed as a given,
why call it a proper name? (This question is particularly vexed when
the theorist's proper name is "de Man".) The answer, I think, is that
"man" as concept would imply the possibility of a proposition. "Man"
would be subject to definition, and thus transformation or trope. But
proper names are not subjects of definition: They are what they are.
If "man" is taken as a given, then, it can only be because it is out of
the loop of qualification. It is presupposed, not defined.
Yet the examples of proper names de Man gives are surprising:
Narcissus and Daphne.19 Nietzsche's triumvirate of metaphor,
metonymy, and anthropomorphism then functions like the plot of an
Ovidian metamorphosis: From a mythological world in which man and
nature appear to be in metaphorical and metonymic harmony, there
occurs a crisis wherein, by a process of seamless transformation, a
break nevertheless occurs in the system of correspondences, leaving
a residue that escapes and remains-the proper name. De Man's
discussion of Baudelaire's sonnets will in fact be haunted by Ovidian
presences: Echo is lurking behind every mention of Narcissus, while
one of the recurring cruxes is whether there is a human substance in
a tree. It is perhaps not an accident that the figures that occupy the
margins of de Man's discussion are female. If de Man's enduring
question is whether linguistic structures and epistemological claims
can be presumed to be compatible, the question of gender cannot be
located exclusively either in language (where the gender of pronouns,
and often of nouns, is inherent in each language) or in the world. By
extension, the present discussion of the nature of "man" cannot fail
to be haunted by the question of gender.
The term "anthropomorphism" in Nietzsche's list thus indicates that
a given is being forced into what otherwise would function as a pure
structure of relation. In addition, Nietzsche calls truth an army of
tropes, thus introducing more explicitly the notion of power, force, or
18. Id. at 241.
19. See id.
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violence. This is not a notion that can fit into the oppositions between
epistemology and rhetoric, but rather disrupts the system. In the text
of the Supreme Court decision that I will discuss in a moment, such
a disruption is introduced when the opposition on which the case is
based, the opposition between natural person and artificial entity,
opens out onto the question of policy. There, too, the question is one
of truth and power, of the separation of the constative-what does the
law say?-from the performative-what does it do?
The bulk of de Man's essay is devoted to a reading of two sonnets
by Baudelaire: Correspondances and Obsession, reproduced here.2°
Correspondances
La Nature est un temple oil de vivants piliers
Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles;
L'homme y passe A travers des forets de symboles
Qui l'observent avec des regards familiers.
Comme de longs 6chos qui de loin se confondent
Dans une t6nebreuse et profonde unit6,
Vaste comme la nuit et comme la clart6,
Les parfums, les couleurs et les sons se r6pondent.
I1 est des parfums frais comme des chairs d'enfants,
Doux comme les hautbois, verts comme les prairies,
-Et d'autres, corrompus, riches et triomphants,
Ayant l'expansion des choses infinies,
Comme l'ambre, le musc, le benjoin et l'encens,
Qui chantent les transports de l'esprit et des sens.
2 1
Correspondences
Nature is a temple, where the living pillars
Sometimes utter indistinguishable words;
Man passes through these forests of symbols
Which regard him with familiar looks.
Like long echoes that blend in the distance
Into a unity obscure and profound,
Vast as the night and as the light,
The perfumes, colors, and sounds correspond.
There are some perfumes fresh as a baby's skin,
Mellow as oboes, verdant as prairies,
-And others, corrupt, rich, and triumphant,
With all the expansiveness of infinite things,
Like ambergris, musk, benjamin, incense,
That sing the transports of spirit and sense.
20. The translations are mine, made for the purpose of bringing out those aspects of the
poems that are relevant to my discussion.
21. BAUDELAIRE, Correspondances, in 1 OEUVRES COMPLPTES, supra note 2, at 11, 11.
1998]
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Obsession
Grands bois, vous m'effrayez comme des cath6drales;
Vous hurlez comme l'orgue; et dans nos coeurs maudits,
Chambres d'6ternel deuil oti vibrent de vieux rales,
R6pondent les 6chos de vos De Profundis.
Je te hais, Oc6an! tes bonds et tes tumultes,
Mon esprit les retrouve en lui; ce rire amer
De l'homme vaincu, plein de sanglots et d'insultes,
Je l'entends dans le rire 6norme de la mer.
Comme tu me plairais, 6 nuit! sans ces 6toiles
Dont la lumi~re parle un langage connu!
Car je cherche le vide, et le noir, et le nu!
Mais les t6n~bres sont elles-m~mes des toiles
Oti vivent, jaillissant de mon oeil par milliers,
Des 6tres disparus aux regards familiers.
22
Obsession
You terrify me, forests, like cathedrals;
You roar like organs; and in our cursed hearts,
Chambers of mourning that quiver with our dying,
Your De Profundis echoes in response.
How I hate you, Ocean! your tumultuous tide
Is flowing in my spirit; this bitter laughter
Of vanquished man, strangled with sobs and insults,
I hear it in the heaving laughter of the sea.
O night, how I would love you without stars,
Whose light can only speak the words I know!
For I seek the void, and the black, and the bare!
But the shadows are themselves a screen
That gathers from my eyes the ones I've lost,
A thousand living things with their familiar looks.
Both poems end up raising "man" as a question-Correspondances
looks upon "man" as if from a great distance, as if from the outside;
Obsession says "I," but then identifies with "vanquished man" whose
laugh is echoed in the sea.
Correspondances is probably the most canonical of Baudelaire's
poems in that it has justified the greatest number of general
statements about Baudelaire's place in literary history. The possibility
of literary history ends up, in some ways, being the real topic of de
Man's essay. De Man will claim that the use of this sonnet to anchor
the history of "the symbolist movement" is based on a reading that
ignores a crucial element in the poem, an element that, if taken
22. BAUDELAIRE, Obsession, in 1 OEUVRES COMPLLTES, supra note 2, at 75, 75-76.
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seriously, will not allow for the edifice of literary history to be built
upon it.
Correspondances sets up a series of analogies between nature, man,
symbols, and metaphysical unity, and among manifestations of the
different physical senses, all through the word "comme" ("like"). A
traditional reading of the poem would say that the lateral analogies
among the senses (perfumes fresh as a baby's skin, mellow as oboes,
green as prairies) are signs that there exists an analogy between man
and nature and between man and the spiritual realm.
De Man focuses on this analogy-making word, "comme," and notes
an anomaly in the final instance. Whereas the first uses of "comme"
in the poem equate different things into likeness, the last one just
introduces a list of examples-there are perfumes that are rich and
corrupt, like musk, ambergris, and frankincense. This is thus a
tautology-there are perfumes like ... perfumes. De Man calls this
a stutter. He writes, "Comme then means as much as 'such as, for
example."23 "Ce Comme n'est pas un comme comme les autres,"'24
writes de Man in a sudden access of French. His sentence performs
the stutter he attributes to the enumeration of the perfumes. Listing
examples would seem to be quite different from proposing analogies.
If the burden of the analogies in Correspondances is to convince us
that the metaphorical similarities among the senses point to a higher
spiritual unity, then sheer enumeration would disrupt that claim.
There is another, more debatable, suggestion in de Man's reading
that attempts to disrupt the anthropomorphism of the forest of
symbols. De Man suggests that the trees are a mere metaphor for a
city crowd in the first stanza. If the living pillars with their familiar
glances are metaphorically a city crowd, then the anthropomorphism
of nature is lost. Man is surrounded by tree-like men, not man-like
trees. It is not "man" whose attributes are taken on by all of nature,
but merely a crowd of men being compared to trees and pillars. De
Man notes that everyone resists this reading-as do I-but the
intensity with which it is rejected does make visible the seduction of
the system that puts nature, god, and man into a perfect unity through
the symbol, which is what has made the poem so important for
literary history. Similarly, if the last "comme" is sheer enumeration
rather than similarity, then the transports in the last line of the poem
would not get us into a transcendent realm, but would be like getting
stuck on the French transportation system (which, as de Man points
out, uses the word "Correspondance" for changes of station within the
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system). All these tropes would not carry us away into the spiritual
realm, but would be an infinite series of substitutions. The echoes
would remain echoes and not merge into a profound unity.
If Correspondances is said to place man in the center of a universe
that reflects him in harmony with all of nature, the poem Obsession
places all of nature and the universe inside the psychology of man.
Even the senses are projections. Obsession is the reading of Corres-
pondances as hallucination. While Correspondances was entirely
declarative, Obsession is almost entirely vocative. (Interestingly, de
Man does not comment on another anomaly in the meaning of the
word "comme"-the "comme" in Obsession that means
"How! "-which is surprising, since it enacts precisely what he calls
"the tropological transformation of analogy into apostrophe."25)
Nature is addressed as a structure haunted by the subject's obsessions.
Everywhere he looks, his own thoughts look back. For
psychoanalytically inclined readers, and indeed for de Man himself in
an earlier essay,26 Obsession demystifies Correspondances. There is
no profound unity in the world, but only, as Lacan would say,
paranoid knowledge.27 But de Man sees the psychological gloss as
another mystification, another anthropomorphism-the very
anthropomorphic mystification that it is the duty of lyric, and of lyric
pedagogy, to promote. "The lyric is not a genre, but one name among
several to designate the defensive motion of understanding., 28 De
Man concludes provocatively: "The resulting couple or pair of texts
indeed becomes a model for the uneasy combination of funereal
monumentality with paranoid fear that characterizes the hermeneutics
and the pedagogy of lyric poetry., 29 What comes to be at stake,
then, is lyric poetry itself as a poetry of the subject. By juxtaposing
lyric and law in this essay, I am implicitly asking whether there is a
relation between the "first person" (the grammatical "I") and the
"constitutional person" (the subject of rights).
"Only a subject can understand a meaning," claims Lacan.3 °
"Conversely, every phenomenon of meaning implies a subject.
31
25. Id. at 261.
26. See Paul de Man, Allegory and Irony in Baudelaire, in ROMANTICISM AND CONTEM-
PORARY CRmCISM 101 (E.S. Burt et al. eds., 1993). This essay is part of the Gauss Seminar
given by de Man in 1967.
27. Lacan writes, "What I have called paranoic [paranoid] knowledge is shown, therefore,
to correspond in its more or less archaic forms to certain critical moments that mark the history
of man's mental genesis, each representing a stage in objectifying identification." JACQUES
LACAN, Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis, in ECRITS 8, 17 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
28. DE MAN, supra note 8, at 261.
29. Id. at 259.
30. LACAN, supra note 27, at 9.
31. Id.
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What de Man seems to be arguing for here is the existence of a
residue of language or rhetoric that exists neither inside nor outside
the "phenomenon of meaning." Does lyric poetry try to give a
psychological gloss to disruptions that are purely grammatical? Are
the periodizations in literary history like "Parnassian" and "Roman-
tic" merely names for rhetorical structures that are not historical? For
de Man, Obsession loses the radical disruption of Correspondances by
making enumeration into a symptom, which is more reassuring than
endless repetition. It is as though de Man were saying that Obsession,
despite, or rather because, it is so psychologically bleak, falls back
within the pleasure principle-that is, the psychological, the hu-
man-whereas Correspondances, which seems so sunny, contains a
disruption that goes beyond the pleasure principle. When de Man says
that we can get Obsession from Correspondances but not the other
way around, this is a way of repeating Freud's experience of the
disruption of the pleasure principle in Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
a study in which Freud grappled with the very limits of
psychoanalysis.32 Freud noticed that there were experiences or facts
that seemed to contradict his notion of the primacy of the pleasure
principle in human life (negative pleasures, the repetition compulsion,
the death instinct).33 As Derrida has shown, Freud kept bringing the
"beyond" back within explainability, but the "beyond" of Freud's
theory kept popping up elsewhere.34 He could, in effect, get the
pleasure principle to explain its beyond, but not anticipate it. The
beyond of the pleasure principle could only exist as a disruption.
De Man makes the surprising claim that Correspondances is not a
lyric, but contains the entire possibility of lyric: "'Obsession,' a text of
recollection and elegiac mourning, adds remembrance to the flat
surface of time in 'Correspondances'-produces at once a her-
meneutic, fallacious, lyrical reading of the unintelligible., 35 The act
of making intelligible, whether in the lyric or in the terminology of
literary history, is for de Man at the end of the essay always an act of
"resistance and nostalgia, at the furthest remove from the materiality
of actual history.,3 6 This would mean that "actual history" is what
escapes and resists intelligibility. Notice how de Man ends the essay:
32. See SIGMUND FREUD, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in 18 THE STANDARD EDITION OF
THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 3, 3-64 (James Strachey ed. &
trans., 1953).
33. See id.
34. See JACQUES DERRIDA, To Speculate-on "Freud," in THE POSTCARD 257, 257-409
(Alan Bass trans., 1987).
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If mourning is called a "chambre d'dternel deuil oii vibrent de
vieux riles," then this pathos of terror states in fact the desired
consciousness of eternity and of temporal harmony as voice and
as song. True "mourning" is less deluded. The most it can do is
to allow for non-comprehension and enumerate non-
anthropomorphic, non-elegiac, non-celebratory, non-lyrical, non-
poetic, that is to say, prosaic, or, better, historical modes of
language power.37
Earlier in the essay, de Man had said of Nietzsche's general analysis
of truth that "truth is always at the very least dialectical, the negative
knowledge of error."38 In another essay, de Man speaks of
"literature as the place where this negative knowledge about the
reliability of linguistic utterance is made available."39 Negativity,
then, is not an assertion of the negative, but a nonpositivity within the
possibility of assertion. The final sentence of Anthropomorphism and
Trope in the Lyric is clearly a version of stating negative knowledge.
But it is also a personification. "True 'mourning"' is said to be "less
deluded."4 ° Underlining the word it as the agent, he writes, "the
most it can do is to allow for non-comprehension., 41 "True mourn-
ing" becomes the subject of this negative knowledge. The subjec-
tivizations performed by lyric upon the unintelligible are here
rejected, but by a personification of mourning. Is mourning-or
rather, "true 'mourning"'-human or inhuman? Or is it what makes
it impossible to close the gap between "man" and rhetoric? In other
words, does this type of personification presuppose knowledge of
human essence, or does it merely confer a kind of rhetorical agency?
Is it anthropomorphic? Is there a difference between personification
and anthropomorphism? Is the text stating its knowledge as if it were
a human, or is it just performing the inescapability of the structures
it is casting off? Has de Man's conclusion really eliminated
anthropomorphism and reduced it to the trope of personification, or
is anthropomorphism inescapable in the notion of mourning? Is this
what lyric poetry-so often structured around the relation between
loss and rhetoric-must decide? or finesse? The least we can say is
that de Man has given the last word in his own text to a per-
sonification.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 242.
39. DE MAN, supra note 13, at 10.
40. DE MAN, supra note 8, at 262.
41. Id.
10




That which henceforth is to be "truth" is now fixed; that is to say,
a uniformly valid and binding designation of things is invented and
the legislature of language also gives the first laws of truth: since
here, for the first time, originates the contrast between truth and
falsity. The liar uses the valid designations, the words, in order to
make the unreal appear as real, e.g., he says, "I am rich," whereas
the right designation of his state would be "poor."
-Nietzsche, Truth and Falsity in an Ultramoral Sense42
The case of Rowland v. California Men's Colony43 is based on a
provision in the United States legal code permitting a "person" to
appear in court in forma pauperis. The relevant legislation reads in
part:
Any court of the United States may authorize the commence-
ment, prosecution or defense of any suit, action, or proceeding,
civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees
and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit
that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor."
In other words, a "person" may go to court without prepayment of
fees if the "person" can demonstrate indigence. The question to be
decided by the Court is whether this provision applies to artificial
persons like corporations or councils, or whether it is meant to apply
only to individuals. In the case that led to Rowland, a council of
prisoners in California attempted to bring suit against the correctional
officers of the prison for the restoration of the practice of providing
free cigarettes for indigent prisoners, which had been discontinued.45
They tried to sue in forma pauperis on the ground that the warden
forbade the council to hold funds of its own.' The district court
found that they had not sufficiently proved indigence.47 They were
allowed to appeal in forma pauperis in order to enable the court to
decide whether the council, as an artificial legal person, is entitled to
sue in forma pauperis. The appeals court decided that they were so
entitled," but this conflicted with the ruling by another circuit.49
42. NIETZSCHE, supra note 15, at 635.
43. Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1966).
45. See Rowland, 506 U.S. at 194.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See California Men's Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 506 U.S.
194 (1993).
49. See FDM Mfg. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 855 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1988).
1998] 559
11
Johnson: Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1998
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 549
The Supreme Court in Rowland considered whether the provisions for
proceeding in forma pauperis should apply only to natural persons, or
also to legal persons like associations and councils. The case is
therefore about what a person is, and how you can tell the difference
between a natural person and an artificial person.
Justice Souter's majority opinion begins with something that in
many ways resembles de Man's stutter of infinite enumeration. In
order to find out what the legal meaning of "person" is, Souter turns
to what is called the "Dictionary Act." The Dictionary Act gives
instructions about how to read acts of Congress; it states: "In
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwise, the word[] 'person' . . . include[s] corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals. 50 Thus, the word "person" does
include artificial entities unless the context indicates otherwise. Next
Souter asks, but what does "context" mean? He turns to Webster's
New International Dictionary, in which he notes that it means "the
part or parts of a discourse preceding or following a 'text' or passage
or a word, or so intimately associated with it as to throw light on its
meaning., 51 The context, then, is the surrounding words of the act.
Of course, Webster's does offer a second meaning for the word
context: "associated surroundings, whether material or mental"-a
reference not to the surrounding text but to the broader reality or
intentionality-but Souter dismisses this by saying, "we doubt that the
broader sense applies here."52 Why? Because "if Congress had meant
to point further afield, as to legislative history, for example, it would
have been natural to use a more spacious phrase, like 'evidence of
congressional intent,' in place of 'context.
' ' 53
The word "natural," which is precisely at issue here-since the
Court is, after all, trying to find out whether the statute applies only
to natural persons-is here applied to an artificial person, Congress,
which is personified as having natural intentionality: "If Congress had
meant .... ." The Court's decision repeatedly relies upon this type of
personification; it is as though Souter has to treat Congress as an
entity with intentions, even natural intentions, in order to say that
Congress could not have meant to include artificial entities in its
ruling. There is a personification of an artificial entity, Congress,
50. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1985).
51. Rowland, 506 U.S. at 199 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE
DICrIONARY 576 (2d ed. 1942)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
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embedded in the very project of interpreting how far the law will
allow for artificial entities to be considered persons.
Turning to the Dictionary Act for "person" and to Webster's
Dictionary for "context," Souter also notes that he has to define
"indicates." The difficulty of doing so pushes him into a volley of
rhetorical flourishes: "A contrary 'indication' may raise a specter short
of inanity, and with something less than syllogistic force.""
"Indicates," it seems, means more than nonsense but less than
logical necessity. In other words, the task of reading becomes an
infinite regress of glossing terms that are themselves supposed to be
determinants of meaning. De Man's linguistic stutter returns here as
the repeated effort to throw language outside itself. We could read a
text, this implies, if only we were sure of the meaning of the words
"context" and "indicate." But those are precisely the words that raise
the question of meaning in its most general form-they cannot be
glossed with any finality because they name the process of glossing
itself.
Souter's text, in fact, is most anthropomorphic at those points
where the infinite regress of language is most threatening. Congress
is endowed with "natural" intentionality in order to sweep away the
abyss of reference. Souter's dismissal of the prisoners' association as
an "amorphous legal creature"55 is the counterpart to the need to
reinforce the anthropomorphizability of the artificial legal creature,
Congress.56 Congress, then, is perhaps an example of de Man's
''proper name."
Souter's opinion proceeds to detail the reasons why he thinks the
in forma pauperis ruling should apply only to natural persons. He
wonders: If an affidavit alleging poverty is required for a person to
proceed in forma pauperis, then can an artificial entity plead poverty?
Souter again turns to Webster's Dictionary to find that poverty is a
human condition, defined as "wanting in material riches or goods;
lacking in the comforts of life; needy."57 Souter also refers to a
previous ruling, which holds that poverty involves being unable to
provide for the "necessities of life."58 It is as though only natural
persons can have "life," and that life is defined as the capacity to lack
54. Id. at 201.
55. Id. at 204.
56. In a response to the present paper when it was delivered at the Yale Law School,
Shoshana Felman made the brilliant suggestion that Souter would have wanted to rewrite
Baudelaire's Correspondances as: "Le Congres est un temple oi) de vivants pilliers laissent
parfois sortir de confuses paroles .... " The neoclassical, Parnassian architecture of official
Washington, D.C. and the common metaphorical expression "pillars of the community" add
piquancy to this suggestion.
57. Rowland, 506 U.S. at 203.
58. Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).
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necessities and comforts. "Artificial entities may be insolvent," writes
Souter, "but they are not well spoken of as 'poor."' 59 An artificial
entity cannot lack the necessities and comforts of life. Only life can
lack. The experience of lack differentiates natural persons from
artificial persons. To lack is to be human. In a sense, we have
returned to de Man's question about mourning. Is lack human, or just
a structure? Whatever the case, the Court holds that associations
cannot be considered persons for the purpose of the in forma pauperis
procedure.
The majority opinion garnered only four votes, however.60 A
dissenting opinion, written by Clarence Thomas, argues that there is
no reason to restrict the broad definition of "person" to natural
persons in this case.61 Thomas quotes the Court's view of "poverty"
as an exclusively "human condition" and comments:
I am not so sure. "Poverty" may well be a human condition in its
"primary sense," but I doubt that using the word in connection
with an artificial entity departs in any significant way from settled
principles of English usage .... Congress itself has used the
word "poor" to describe entities other than natural persons,
referring in at least two provisions of the United States Code to
the world's "poorest countries"-a term that is used as a
synonym for the least developed of the so-called "developing
countries. ,62
Souter has glossed the word "poor" as though speakers of English
could use it only literally. Thomas responds by including the figurative
use of "poor" as included within normal usage. The boundaries
between natural persons and artificial persons cannot be determined
by usage because those boundaries have always already been blurred.
In treating Congress as an entity with natural intentions, indeed,
Souter has already shown how "natural" the artificial can be.
At another point, Thomas takes issue with Souter's discussion of a
case in which an association or corporation is considered a person
despite strong contextual indicators to the contrary. In the case of
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,63 it was decided that "white person"
could include corporations because the "larger context" and "pur-
pose" of the law was to protect Native Americans against non-Native
American squatters, and that purpose would be frustrated if a "white
59. Rowland, 506 U.S. at 203.
60. See id. at 194.
61. See id. at 213 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 218-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
63. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979). Both Souter and Thomas discuss
Wilson in their Rowland opinions. See Rowland, 506 U.S. at 209; id. at 214 n.1 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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person" could simply incorporate in order to escape the provision of
the law.' Souter admits that "because a wholly legal creature has no
color, and belongs to no race, the use of the adjective 'white' to
describe a 'person' is one of the strongest contextual indicators
imaginable that 'person' covers only individuals."65 Justice Thomas
argues that if the court "was correct in holding that the statutory term
'white person' includes a corporation (because the 'context' does not
'indicate otherwise')-the conclusion that an association is a 'person'
for in forma pauperis purposes is inescapable."'  Perhaps another
inescapable conclusion is that despite its apparent reference to the
physical body, the phrase "white person" is the name, not of a
natural, but of a corporate person.
Justice Thomas refutes the reasons Souter has given for finding that
artificial entities are excluded from the in forma pauperis provision,
noting that there may be sound policy reasons for wanting to exclude
them, but that the law as written cannot be construed to have done
so.6" The Court's job, he writes, is not to make policy but to
interpret a statute. "Congress has created a rule of statutory construc-
tion (an association is a 'person') and an exception to that rule (an
association is not a 'person' if the 'context indicates otherwise'), but
the Court has permitted the exception to devour the rule [a nice per-
sonification]."' Thomas thus argues that the Court treats the rule as
if artificial entities were excluded rather than included unless the
context indicates otherwise. "Whatever 'unless the context indicates
otherwise' means," writes Thomas, "it cannot mean 'unless there are
sound policy reasons for concluding otherwise.' 69
Permitting artificial entities to proceed in forma pauperis may be
unwise, and it may be an inefficient use of the Government's
limited resources, but I see nothing in the text of the in forma
pauperis statute indicating that Congress has chosen to exclude
such entities from the benefits of that law.v°
Thus Thomas's two conservative instincts are at war with each other:
He would like the Government not to spend its money, but he would
also like to stick to the letter of the law.
The question of what counts as a juridical person has, in fact, been
modified over time in the legal code. It was in 1871 (significantly,
64. Rowland, 506 U.S. at 214 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Wilson, 442 U.S. at
725).
65. Id. at 209.
66. Id. at 214 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 215-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 222 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 214 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 215-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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perhaps, at the beginning of the end of post-Civil War Reconstruc-
tion) that Congress first passed the so-called Dictionary Act, in which
it stated that the word "person". "may extend and be applied to
bodies politic and corporate.",71 More recently, the question of fetal
personhood has been debated, not only in the Roe v. Wade decision,
in which it was decided that a fetus was not a legal person,72 but also
in Weaks v. Mounter, in which it was decided that a fetus was a
person who could sue for intrauterine injuries, but only after birth.73
Recently, the question of granting patents for forms of life like oil-
slick-eating bacteria or genetically altered mice has raised the question
of whether a hybrid between humans and close animal relatives can
be patented. 74 And more recently, of course, the question of the
ethics and legality of cloning humans has been raised. The law has
reached another crisis about the definition of "person." In an article
on constitutional personhood, Michael Rivard writes:
Current law allows patents for genetically-engineered animals but
not for human beings. Humans are not patentable subject matter
because patents are property rights, and the Thirteenth
Amendment forbids any grant of property rights in a human
being. Nevertheless, this exclusion for humans will prove
impossible to maintain: within ten to thirty years, or perhaps
sooner, advances in genetic engineering technology should allow
scientists to intermingle the genetic material of humans and
animals to produce human-animal hybrids .... It may soon be
possible to patent-and to enslave-human-animal hybrids who
think and feel like humans, but who lack constitutional protection
under the Thirteenth Amendment.76
Recall that the Thirteenth Amendment is the amendment that
abolishes slavery. The constitutional protection against slavery
operates as a constraint on the patent office, but it does so in a
paradoxical way. The fear of reinstituting something like slavery, or
property in humans, is a reaction to, but also a sign of, what must be
71. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
72. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73. See Weaks v. Mounter, 493 P.2d 1307 (Nev. 1972).
74. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that a "live,
human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter." In 1989, Harvard University received
a patent for a genetically altered mouse or "oncomouse." See SHELDON KROMSKY, BIOTECH-
NICS AND SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL GENETICS 44-45 (1991); Ned Hettinger, Patenting
Life: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 267 (1995).
75. See Gina Kolata, Scientist Clones Human Embryos and Creates an Ethical Challenge,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at Al.
76. Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory
of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425,1428-29
(1992).
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an ongoing research goal to come as close as possible to creating the
ownable, enslavable human.77
Constitutional personhood has in fact often been defined in
proximity to slavery. In the most notorious example, the Dred Scott
case of 1857,78 we find many of the same issues of legal standing,
personhood, and interpretation that were present in Rowland. This
case, too, is about who has the right to sue. In Dred Scott the
operative word is "citizen" rather than "person," but as Justice Taney
put it in his prefatory remarks, "The words 'people of the United
States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same
thing., 79 Many of the same issues of legal rights and protections, as
well as legal interpretation, arise. Dred Scott, whose original legal
status was that of a slave, was taken by his master to free territory.
Upon his return to Missouri, he sued for his freedom, arguing that his
stay in free territory made him free. Justice Taney ruled not only that
Scott was not free, but that he was not a citizen with the right to sue,
and indeed that persons of African descent had no rights that the
white man was bound to respect. Taney derives this opinion from the
words of the Constitution and of the Declaration of Independence.
He quotes the words of the Declaration:
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among them is life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are
instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.8"
Then Taney goes on to say, "The general words above quoted would
seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in
a similar instrument at this day would be so understood."81 In other
words, he sees as his task only to interpret the meaning of the law,
not to bring it up to date, which would, in a sense, be a policy
decision. He goes on to explain why the Declaration of Independence
could not have meant what it says:
It is too clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not
intended to be included and formed no part of the people who
framed and adopted this Declaration; for if the language, as
77. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara Kopytoff, Property First, Humanity Second:
The Recognition of the Slave's Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 520
(1989) ("The humanity of the slave, requiring that he be treated with the care due other humans
and not like other forms of property, became part of the owner's property rights.").
78. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
79. Id. at 404.




Johnson: Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1998
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 549
understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the
distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence
would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the
principles they asserted .... Yet the men who framed this
Declaration were great men-high in literary acquirements, high
in their sense of honor and incapable of asserting principles
inconsistent with those on which they were acting. 2
Thus, enslaved African Americans could not have been included
among the people, because the Framers were great men, and could
not have been inconsistent. Notice how literature is brought in to
confirm their greatness: They were high in literary attainments; they
did not use words lightly. The greatness of white men requires that
they not be inconsistent. In order for the founding fathers to maintain
their greatness, the African American has to have no rights. If the
United States has reached a crisis over the rights of Africans, it is
more important to maintain the consistency of the founding fathers
than to enact the literality of their words. The phrase "all men," like
the word "man," introduces a crisis or a stutter if it is opened as
anything other than a given.
This split between the Framers and their words-this advance of
the words over their understood meaning-is also pointed out by Don
Fehrenbacher in his book Slavery, Law, and Politics.83 He (along
with many others) notes that the Constitution never uses the word
"slavery" even in the three clauses that apply to that institution, as if
the Framers obscurely knew that the institution would disappear. The
most subtle sign of that nudging into disappearance is a revision of
the Fugitive Slave Clause.' 4 Fehrenbacher writes:
Perhaps most revealing of all was a last-minute revision of the
fugitive slave clause. As it came from the committee of style, the
clause began: "No person legally held to service or labour in one
state, escaping into another, shall... be discharged from
service . .." The revised version read: "No person held to
service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof." Because
of its contextual ambiguity, the word "legally" would have
permitted the inference that the Constitution explicitly affirmed
the legality of slavery. The framers, in shifting to the phrase
"under the laws thereof," lent strong support to those anti-slavery
spokesmen of a later day who would insist that slavery was
82. Id.
83. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN
HISTORICAL PERPECrIVE (1981).
84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, c. 3.
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without national existence and strictly the creature of local
law.85
It is amazing what a difference such a small change can introduce, by
shifting an implicit endorsement of the legality of slavery to a mere
description of its legality in some states. Fehrenbacher ends his
discussion by saying, "it is as though the framers were half-consciously
trying to frame two constitutions, one for their own time and the
other for the ages, with slavery viewed bifocally-that is, plainly
visible at their feet, but disappearing when they lifted their eyes.' 86
A written text of law can thus contain a double intention, the trace of
a compromise between differing opinions. No wonder interpreting the
law's intention is so complicated. That intention can always already
be multiple. The distinction Justice Thomas made between
interpreting the law and making policy cannot hold if the law's
ambiguity allows for the possibility that the policy it governs will
change.
III
The "inhuman" is not some kind of mystery, or some kind of
secret; the inhuman is: linguistic structures, the play of linguistic
tensions, linguistic events that occur, possibilities which are inherent
in language-independently of any intent or any drive or any wish
or any desire we might have .... If one speaks of the inhuman, the
fundamental non-human character of language, one also speaks of
the fundamental non-definition of the human as such.
-Paul de Man, Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator"87
Only smoking distinguishes humans from the rest of the animals.
-Anonymous (quoted in Richard Klein,
Cigarettes Are Sublime)88
The case of Rowland v. California Men's Colony was ostensibly
about whether a council of inmates could sue prison officials in forma
pauperis to get their cigarettes back. The details of the case seemed
irrelevant to the question of whether an artificial person has the right
to sue in forma pauperis. Yet perhaps some of those details deserve
note. Is it relevant that the suit to decide this question was brought
by a council of inmates? The phenomenon of the inmate civil suit has
85. Fehrenbacher, supra note 83, at 14.
86. Id. at 15.
87. PAUL DE MAN, Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator," in THE RESISTANCE TO
THEORY, supra note 13, at 73, 96.
88. RICHARD KLEIN, CIGARETTES ARE SUBLIME 23 (1993).
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grown to the point where the case law may very well be transformed
by it. In a 1995 study of inmate suits in California, it was reported
that "[f]or the last fourteen years at least, the federal courts have
faced a growing caseload and workload challenge posed by inmate
cases.... By 1992, these filings numbered nearly 30,000, and
constituted 13% of the courts' total civil case filings nationwide."89
The majority of these suits are filed in forma pauperis.° The
Supreme Court's decision may well have been affected by what
Clarence Thomas calls "policy considerations."91
If prisoners are affecting the nature of civil proceedings, they are
also, at least figuratively, affecting theoretical discussions about the
nature of rational choice and the evolution of cooperation. The
celebrated "Prisoner's Dilemma" has been central to questions of self-
interest and social goods since it was introduced by Albert Tucker in
1950.92 Max Black has even entitled his discussion of these issues The
"Prisoner's Dilemma" and the Limits of Rationality.93 Why is it that
the theoretical study of rational choice has recourse to "man"
conceived as a prisoner? Does this have anything to do with the
poets' tendency to see the sonnet form as a prison?
And is it by chance that Rowland is about cigarettes? On the one
hand, it seems paradoxical that the council has to demonstrate its
indigence in order to pursue its suit against the prison directors for
depriving them of cigarettes; in prisons cigarettes function as a form
of currency. On the other hand, it seems fitting that the personhood
of the association is the counterpart to the humanity of the inmates,
which, as common wisdom (quoted above, second epigraph) would
have it, is demonstrated by the act of smoking. The prisoners would
thus, in a very attenuated way, be suing for their humanity. As
Richard Klein has wittily shown, smoking serves no function other
than to enact a structure of desire-of human desire for self-tran-
scendence, for repetition, for bodily experience corresponding to
something other than the "necessities of life" required for existence
alone: in short, desire for the sublime.94
89. Kim Mueller, Inmates' Civil Rights Cases and the Federal Courts: Insights Derived from
a Field Research Project in the Eastern District of California, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1255, 1258-
59 (1995). In the Eastern District of California, inmates' civil rights actions constituted nearly
30% of the case filings. See id. (California Men's Colony is not in the Eastern District; it is in
San Luis Obispo, in the Central District.)
90. See id. at 1276, 1281.
91. Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 217 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514 n.15 (1994) (discussing how
Tucker created the original version of the game).
93. MAX BLACK, The "Prisoner's Dilemma" and the Limits of Rationality, in PERPLEXITIES:
RATIONAL CHOICE, THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA, METAPHOR, POETIC AMBIGUITY, AND OTHER
PUZZLES 112 (1990); see also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
94. See KLEIN, supra note 88. Klein notes, incidentally, that Baudelaire is one of the first
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The sublimity of cigarettes has become increasingly imperceptible
in the United States, with the rise of smoking bans and health
warnings, but Klein makes it clear that cigarettes were always good
because they were bad. "Cigarettes are bad. That is why they are
good-not good, not beautiful, but sublime. '9 5 They were not, in
fact, always the un-American objects they appear to be today:
"Whenever the society needed more soldiers . . . smoking cigarettes
changed its value and became not only laudatory but patriotic. '9 6 In
addition, cigarettes occupy a strange niche with respect to the United
States government. Recent debates about whether or not nicotine is
a drug that should be regulated by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) have been conducted on the assumption that the FDA, an
agency of the executive branch of government, is the appropriate
body to deal with this vexed question. But in fact, as John Jevicky has
argued, Congress has repeatedly reserved for itself the right to
regulate tobacco products, except insofar as they are labeled for a
medicinal purpose.97
Both a drug and not a drug, both legal and banned, a soldier's
comfort and a veteran's cancer, the relation between cigarettes and
"natural persons" raises the question of what "natural" means. But
cigarettes have raised the question of the rights of "corporate
persons" in interesting ways, too, through recent wrongful death suits
against tobacco companies. In attempting to keep the records of
damaging research about nicotine out of the courts by appealing to
attorney-client privilege, the defendant corporations are testing the
limits of corporate personhood.98 In other words, tobacco is located
precisely at crisis points in the definition of both natural and artificial
persons.
If anthropomorphism relies on the givenness of "man" for its
rhetorical effect, tobacco seems well placed both to instate and to
undercut what counts as "human." Indeed, in one of Richard Klein's
most powerful and sweeping observations, tobacco, a Native
American product, is what brought modern Western man into being:
French writers to use the word "cigarette" in print (in his Salons de 1848). See id. at 8.
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id. at 4.
97. See John E. Jevicky, FDA's Regulation of Tobacco Products: A Flagrant Disregard of
Congressional Intent, 24 N. KY. U. L. REV. 535 (1997). Jevicky explains:
In 1906, Congress's enactment of the Pure Food and Drugs Act gave no authority over
tobacco products to FDA's predecessor, the Bureau of Chemistry. In 1914, the Bureau of
Chemistry decided that, even though smoking was already widespread, tobacco not labeled
for a medicinal purpose did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Pure Food & Drugs Act.
Id. at 537. The analogy with recent discussions of the legality of marijuana is striking.
98. See Clay Calvert, Smoking Out Big Tobacco, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 391 (1997); Christine
Hatfield, The Privilege Doctrines-Are They Just Another Discovery Tool Utilized by the
Tobacco Industry to Conceal Damaging Information?, 16 PACE L. REV. 525 (1996).
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The introduction of tobacco into Europe in the sixteenth century
corresponded with the arrival of the Age of Anxiety, the
beginning of modern consciousness that accompanied the
invention and universalization of printed books, the discovery of
the New World, the development of rational, scientific methods,
and the concurrent loss of medieval theological assurances. The
Age of Anxiety gave itself an incomparable and probably
indispensable remedy in the form of tobacco; it was an antidote
brought by Columbus from the New World against the anxiety
that his discoveries occasioned in the Eurocentered consciousness
of Western culture, confronted by the unsuspected countenance
of a great unknown world contiguous with its own. The
paradoxical experience of smoking tobacco, with its contradictory
physical effects, its poisonous taste and unpleasant pleasure, was
enthusiastically taken up by modernity as a drug for easing the
anxiety arising from the shock of successive assaults on old
certainties and the prospect of greater unknowns.99
In the article cited above by Michael Rivard, Toward a General
Theory of Constitutional Personhood,1 °° the drive to formulate a
clear-cut definition of what would count as a constitutional person
appears to be operating under the imperative precisely to counter the
"assaults on old certainties and greater unknowns" caused by the
possibility of transgenic humanoid species. But in its nearly one
hundred pages of argument for an ironclad "personhood presumption
theory," the fundamental definition of the constitutional person turns
out very much to resemble de Man's stutter or Souter's abyss of
reference. Rivard quotes Daniel Dennett quoting Harry Frankfurt
elucidating the fundamental characteristic of self-awareness:
Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that,
men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and
motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their
preferences and purposes, from what they are."0'
This is paradoxical enough to be true (and reminiscent of Lacan's
theory of the mirror stage"°2), but it is hard to see how the capacity
for self-difference can be tested and legislated as a basis for
constitutional personhood.
99. KLEIN, supra note 88, at 27.
100. Rivard, supra note 76.
101. Rivard, supra note 76, at 1486 (quoting DANIEL DENNETr, BRAINSTORMS 281 (1981)
(quoting Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in WHAT IS A
PERSON? 127 (M. Goodman ed., 1988)).
102. See LACAN, The Mirror Stage As Formative of the Function of the I As Revealed in
Psychoanalytic Experience, in tCRITS, supra note 27, at 1.
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In Rivard's view, "corporations would be presumed constitutional
nonpersons," especially for liberty-related rights, unless the cor-
poration could rebut its nonperson status by showing specific natural
persons "who would be affected if the corporation were denied these
rights."' 3 This is the opposite of the Dictionary Act, which con-
siders a corporation a person "unless the context indicates otherwise."
Rivard is arguing for the rights of new biological species who can pass
the "self-awareness test" (wanting to be different from what one is),
and he claims that corporations, by their nature, do not pass this test.
But the question of the nature of corporations as persons has never
been a simple one, as Rivard admits. Gregory A. Mark has outlined
in detail the history of corporate personhood.' ° The relation
between corporations and the natural persons who compose them has
grown more complicated over time. In most discussions of the matter,
it is the "natural" person that functions as the known quantity, and
the "artificial" that is either just an "aggregate" of natural persons, or
a fiction created by the state, or a mere metaphor, or actually
resembles (is like, to return to the Baudelairean word) a natural
person in that it has a "will" of its own. Such a corporate will is a
form of agency separate from that of the natural corporators, who
exist behind the "veil" of the corporation. 5
Much of Mark's article concerns the exact rhetorical valence of this
personification:
American law has always recognized that people's activities could
be formally organized and that the resulting organizations could
be dealt with as units. Personification, however, is important
because it became far more than a quaint device making it
possible for the law to deal with organized business entities. In
American legal and economic history, personification has been
vital because it (1) implies a single and unitary source of control
over the collective property of the corporation's members, (2)
defines, encourages, and legitimates the corporation as an
103. Id. at 1501-02.
104. See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American
Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987).
105. The history of theories of corporate personhood is summarized in Mark, see id. at 1441-
83, and in Rivard, see Rivard, supra note 76, at 1450-65. The term "veil" used to refer to the
personified appearance of the corporation has long been used in rhetorical treatises to describe
the nature of allegorical representation. See, e.g., PIERRE FONTANIER, LES FIGURES DU
DISCOURS (1968). Allegory "consists of a proposition with a double meaning, literal and spiritual
at once, through which one presents a thought under the image of another thought, capable of
rendering it more striking or more perceptive than if it had been presented without any sort of
veil." Id. at 144 (translation by the author) (emphasis added). In Rowland, Justice Souter speaks
of "piercing the veil" of the association in order to see the individuals who compose it. See
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 195,207 (1993). A veil, then, is a sign in both
legal and literary language that a figurative dimension must be taken into consideration.
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autonomous, creative, self-directed economic being, and (3)
captures rights, ultimately even constitutional rights, for cor-
porations thereby giving corporate property unprecedented
protection from the state."°6
Mark takes seriously the role of language in the evolving history of
the corporation. Philosophers and legislators have gone to great
lengths to minimize the rhetorical damage, to eliminate per-
sonification as far as possible, but he asserts that it is not just a figure
of speech to speak of a corporation's "mind," or even its "life."
"Practical experience, not just anthropomorphism, fixed the corporate
mind in the management hierarchy."'0 7 The corporation resembles
a human being in its capacity to "take resolves in the midst of
conflicting motives," to "will change., 10 8 Yet the analogy is not
perfect. The corporation, for example, unlike its corporators, is
potentially immortal. The effect of personification appears to derive
its rhetorical force from the ways in which the corporation resembles
a natural person, yet the corporation's immortality in no way
diminishes its personification. When Mark says that it is "not just
anthropomorphism" that underpins the agency of the corporation, 9
he still implies that we can know what anthropomorphism is. But his
final sentence stands this presupposition on its head. Far from
claiming that a corporation's characteristics are derived from a
knowable human essence, Mark suggests that what have been claimed
to be the essential characteristics of man (especially "economic man")
have in fact been borrowed from the nature of the corporation:
Personification with its roots in historic theological disputes and
modern business necessity, had proved to be a potent symbol to
legitimate the autonomous business corporation and its
management. Private property rights had been transferred to
associations, associations had themselves become politically
legitimate, and the combination had helped foster modern
political economy. The corporation, once the derivative tool of
the state, had become its rival, and the successes of the
autonomous corporate management turned the basis for belief in
an individualist conception of property on its head. The protests
of modern legists notwithstanding, the business corporation had
become the quintessential economic man."0
106. Mark, supra note 104, at 1443.
107. Id. at 1475.
108. Id. at 1476.
109. Id. at 1475.
110. Id. at 1482-83.
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Theories of rationality, naturalness, and the "good," presumed to be
grounded in the nature of "man," may in reality be taking their
notions of human essence not from "natural man" but from business
corporations.
Ambivalence about personification, especially the personification of
abstractions, has in fact permeated not only legal but also literary
history. Nervousness about the agency of the personified corporation
echoes the nervousness Enlightenment writers felt about the
personifications dreamed up by the poets. As Steven Knapp puts it in
his book Personification and the Sublime:
Allegorical personification-the endowing of metaphors with the
agency of literal persons-was only the most obvious and
extravagant instance of what Enlightenment writers perceived,
with a mixture of admiration and uneasiness, as the unique ability
of poetic genius to give the force of literal reality to figurative
"inventions." More important than the incongruous presence of
such agents was their contagious effect on the ostensibly literal
agents with which they interacted."'
The uncanniness of the personification, then, was derived from its way
of putting in question what the "natural" or the "literal" might be.
What the personification of the corporation ends up revealing,
paradoxically enough, is that there is nothing "natural" about the
natural person often taken as its model. The natural person, far from
being a "given," is always the product of a theory of what the given
is. This point may be made more clearly through an extreme version
of corporate personhood. In a study of corporate rights, Meir Dan-
Cohen goes so far as to create the notion of a "personless cor-
poration," a corporate "person" entirely controlled by computers,
which would nevertheless still possess a "will" and a "personhood" of
its own."2 Similarly, we might now ask how it has come to seem
"natural" that the "natural person" with which the corporate person
is compared is somehow always a "genderless person"; that unnatural
genderless person who serves to ground both anthropomorphism and
rational choice.
We have finally come back to the question of whether there is a
difference between anthropomorphism and personification, which
arose at the end of the discussion of the essay by Paul de Man. It can
now be seen that everything hangs on this question. Anthropomor-
phism, unlike personification, depends on the givenness of the essence
111. STEVEN KNAPP, PERSONIFICATION AND THE SUBLIME 2 (1985).
112. MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR
BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 46-51 (1986).
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of the human; the mingling of personifications on the same footing as
"real" agents threatens to make the uncertainty about what human-
ness is come to consciousness. Perhaps the loss of unconsciousness
about the lack of humanness is what de Man was calling "true
'mourning."'113 Perhaps the "fallacious lyrical reading of the unintel-
ligible" is exactly what legislators count on lyric poetry to provide: the
assumption that the human has been or can be defined. The human
can then be presupposed without the question of its definition being
raised as a question-legal or otherwise. Thus the poets truly would
be, as Shelley claimed, the "unacknowledged legislators of the
world,"'14 not because they covertly determine policy, but because
it is somehow necessary and useful that there be a powerful, presup-
posable, unacknowledgment. But the very rhetorical sleight of hand
that would instate such an unacknowledgment is indistinguishable
from the rhetorical structure that would empty it. Lyric and law are
two of the most powerful discourses that exist along the fault line of
this structure.
113. DE MAN, supra note 8, at 262.
114. Percy Bysshe Shelley, A Defense of Poetry, in CRITICAL THEORY SINCE PLATO, supra
note 15, at 515, 529.
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